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Proposed legislation called the 
Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 
introduced a new model for customer 
choice among publicly funded 
reemployment services.  The Bush 
administration recommended a two-year 
federal budget of $3.6 billion to provide 
each eligible unemployment insurance 
(UI) claimant a personal reemployment 
account (PRA) of up to $3,000.  Personal 
reemployment account funds could be 
used for three things: 1) to purchase 
reemployment services, 2) as a 
reemployment bonus, and 3) as extended 
income maintenance for exhaustees of 
regular UI benefits.  Personal 
reemployment account offers would be 
targeted  to UI beneficiaries most likely to 
exhaust their UI entitlements using state 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services (WPRS) models.
If PRAs are enacted, core services at 
one-stop career centers would remain free 
to all customers, but PRA recipients 
wishing to use intensive, supportive, and 
job training services would be required to 
use account funds to purchase them from 
a qualified public or private vendor.  
Additionally, PRA recipients who return 
to work within 13 weeks of their UI claim 
date may receive the unused balance in 
the PRA as a cash reemployment bonus.  
Sixty percent of the balance would be 
paid upon reemployment with the 
remainder payable after six months steady 
employment.  Those failing to gain 
reemployment and exhausting regular UI 
entitlement could draw support payments 
from their PRAs at the rate of their 
weekly benefit amounts (WBAs).
The PRA proposal combines several 
employment initiatives in an innovative  
way, but legislation authorizing PRAs has 
not yet been enacted.  However, the 
proposal remains active and has the 
president’s continued support. The W.E. 
Upjohn Institute has investigated aspects 
of how the proposed PRAs would work 
under a grant from the U.S. Department 
of Labor.  The Institute conducted PRA 
simulation analyses using a unique data 
set for the state of Georgia linking UI 
claims and employment services records 
(O’Leary and Eberts 2003).  To be 
forward looking, our simulations used the 
new WPRS model now being 
implemented in Georgia. 
PRA offers would be targeted 
to UI beneficiaries most likely to 
exhaust their UI entitlements 
using state WPRS models
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PRA Budgets and Service Prices
The proposed $3.6 billion for PRA 
enrollments over two years requires funds 
be distributed to states in proportion to 
their share of national unemployment.  
Based on 2002 unemployment figures, 
Georgia’s share would be 2.37 percent or 
$85.32 million.  The proposal also 
requires that PRA funds be allocated 
within states in proportion to regional 
shares of state unemployment.  Given that 
offers are to be targeted using WPRS 
scores to those most likely to exhaust 
their benefit entitlement, nearly all offers 
would be made to UI claimants in the top 
30 percent of the state WPRS distribution 
of claimant scores.  Consequently, we 
focus our simulations on that group of 
claimants.
Since the simulation analysis required 
monetary values for services, 
hypothetical prices were set based on 
statewide service expenditures, service 
usage rates, and relative valuations for 
services.  Based on our sample for 
analysis, Table 1 summarizes imputed 
prices for services as well as usage rates 
during the two PRA relevant time 
periods: the first 13 weeks and the 
remaining 39 weeks in the UI benefit 
year.  In addition to supportive and 
training services, Georgia one-stop 
centers offer five types of intensive 
services.  The most popular intensive 
services among those potentially eligible 
for a PRA are customer service plan and 
counseling.  The table shows that among 
those profiled, 18.9 and 20.3 percent of 
responses observed in the UI 
reemployment bonus experiments 
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001).  The 
simulation grants a first bonus payment 
for UI duration of less than 13 weeks, and 
a second bonus payment when there are 
also positive earnings in the first and third 
quarters following the claim and at least 
$2,000 in earnings the second quarter.  
Under the proposal, a second bonus is not 
paid if reemployment services are 
purchased after a first bonus payment.  
Table 2 shows that for the baseline 
simulation, 26.7 percent of the sample 
could be paid both bonuses—provided 
funds remained in the PRA after purchase 
of services—while a total of 40.2 percent 
of those potentially offered a bonus 
appear to qualify for a first bonus 
payment.  Since they did not gain 
employment during the first 13 weeks, 
58.8 percent of the sample would not 
qualify for either bonus but could use 
PRA funds for services or income support 
payments after benefit exhaustion.
If every UI claimant offered a PRA 
accepted, and if every recipient spent the 
entire $3,000 grant, then 28,440 offers 
could be made over two years with the 
Georgia budget of $85.32 million.  
However, it is unlikely that all account 
recipients will spend their entire grant.  
Table 3 summarizes the average cost per 
offer given the prices and usage pattern 
for services observed in Georgia.  Since 
there is uncertainty about what elements 
of PRAs may emerge from current 
deliberations or future proposals, the table 
presents results for three combinations: 1) 
bonus, purchase of services, and 
claimants used these services during the 
first 13 weeks. The table further shows 
that the bulk of service use occurs in that 
earlier time frame. Relatively small 
proportions of UI claimants use either 
supportive or training services, which are 
imputed to be most costly.
PRA Simulations
Our simulations focus on estimating 
the average expected cost per $3,000 
PRA offer, and the number of offers 
possible over two years given the budget.  
Estimates of these magnitudes are critical 
for states planning for PRA enrollment 
over a two-year cycle.  The simulations 
also provide evidence on the pattern of 
service use, bonus receipt, and income 
maintenance payments likely to result 
under PRAs. 
To span the range of possible 
responses to PRA offers, our simulations 
include a baseline of no change in 
behavior regarding service use and UI 
benefit receipt, as well as impacts 
shortening UI duration by 1 and 2 weeks.  
These alternatives encompass the range of 
Table 1 Estimated Services Usage Rates and Prices for Intensive, Supportive, and 
Training Services among WPRS Profiled UI Claimants in Georgia, 
Program Year 2001
Services
Up to 13 weeks 
(%)





Service coordination 0.5 0.2 356
Customer service plan 18.9 4.6 356
In-depth assessment 0.1 0.0 712
Counseling 20.3 5.1 712
Expanded workshop 0.4 0.3 712
Supportive services 1.7 0.6 1,068
Training services 2.7 1.8 1,424
Table 2 Sample Percentages by 
Employment Status in PRA 
Time Periods among 
Recipients Profiled to be 








Relatively small proportions 
of UI claimants use either 
supportive or training 
services, which are imputed 
to be most costly. 
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about 13 percent of this target group in 
Georgia.  Even with a 1- or 2-week 
behavioral response, the Georgia budget 
would permit nearly 17,000 offers per 
year.
If the PRA included only the bonus 
and purchase of services, not the 
extended benefits feature, more than 
31,000 offers per year could be made 
with the Georgia budget regardless of 
the behavioral response.  For offers that 
were simply $3,000 targeted bonuses, 
more than 43,000 offers per year could 
be made with the PRA grant to Georgia.  
Additional Program Design 
Considerations
Our simulation results are very robust 
relative to the assumed service prices.  
Cutting service prices in half would 
increase the number of offers possible by 
only about 20 percent.  However, there is 
uncertainty about how charging for 
services would affect the pattern of 
services chosen. 
Under what conditions would a PRA 
recipient either purchase services or take 
their chances and pursue bonus 
payments?  To investigate this question, 
we identified the reemployment 
outcomes that would make a participant 
financially indifferent toward the 
following two extremes: 1) purchasing 
no services with the hope of receiving 
the full PRA amount in bonus 
payments, or 2) spending the entire 
PRA amount to purchase services with 
the hope of speeding up reemployment 
or receiving a higher reemployment 
wage.  To spend the entire budget on 
services, the UI beneficiary must expect 
either earnings to be nearly 14 percent 
higher or that employment will occur at 
least 6 weeks sooner.  Research on 
exhaustee payments, 2) bonus and 
purchase of services, and 3) bonus only 
with free services.  
The Average Cost of PRA Offers
The top row of Table 3 reports that 
offers with all three elements would cost 
an average of $2,475 in the absence of 
any behavioral response.  If durations for 
those offered PRAs are 1 week shorter, 
the average cost per offer rises by $40, if 
the response is 2 weeks the cost rises by 
$76 per offer from the baseline.  The 
increased cost results from more 
beneficiaries becoming employed soon 
enough to qualify for bonus payments.  
The average cost increases resulting 
from responses to the PRA offer are 
modest.
If the extended jobless benefits feature 
of PRAs is eliminated, the average 
baseline cost of a $3,000 account drops 
more than $1,000 to $1,452.  Accounting 
for 1- and 2-week behavioral responses 
increases the average cost by $39 and 
$76, respectively. 
The bottom row of Table 3 shows costs 
associated with simplified PRAs 
involving only a targeted reemployment 
bonus.   Simulations for Georgia indicate 
that the baseline $3,000 bonus offer 
would cost $1,040 in payments, and if 
insured durations declined by 1 or 2 
weeks the costs would rise by $46 and 
$91, respectively.  Previous analysis of 
targeted reemployment bonuses 
suggested that cash offers as large as 
$3,000 would not be cost effective, but 
smaller offers could be cost effective 
while still encouraging quicker return to 
work (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 
forthcoming).
The Number of PRA Offers Possible
Table 4 translates the PRA average 
cost figures into estimates of the number 
of offers that could be made assuming 
100 percent acceptance of PRA offers.  
An 80 percent acceptance rate was 
observed in the Illinois bonus experiment, 
which required a formal acceptance of the 
offer (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).   
Assuming that acceptance is not 
correlated with factors systematically 
influencing the rate of spending from 
PRAs, enrollment estimates could be 
adjusted by a factor equal to the 
reciprocal of the take-up rate.  Our 
simulations indicate that the baseline 
PRA with all three elements could be 
offered to 34,473 Georgia UI claimants 
over two years.  That is about 17,000 per 
year, or about 6.3 percent of Georgia UI 
claimants based on 2001 data.  The  PRA 
proposal targets WPRS profiled claimants 
most likely to exhaust benefits who are 
initially eligible for at least 20 weeks of 
benefits, and 17,000 offers constitute 
Table 3 Average Cost per PRA Offer for Alternative Combinations of Features ($)
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and 
UI exhaustee payments
2,475 2,515 2,551
Bonus and purchase services 1,452 1,491 1,528
Bonus only with free services 1,040 1,086 1,131
Table 4 Number of PRA Offers Possible in Georgia over Two Years for 
Alternative Combinations of Features Assuming All Offers Are Accepted
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and 
UI exhaustee payments 34,473 33,924 33,446
Bonus and purchase services 65,149 63,538 62,111
Bonus only with free services 93,403 89,473 85,929
If the extended jobless benefits 
feature of PRAs is eliminated, 
the average baseline cost of a 
$3,000 account drops more 
than $1,000 to $1,452.
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delivery regions within states is 
determined by the estimated share of 
unemployment.  This formula will yield a 
disproportionate share of PRA dollars to 
qualified UI claimants in states with 
relatively exclusionary UI eligibility 
conditions.  The total unemployment rate 
exceeds the insured unemployment rate 
by a greater margin in such areas.  Since 
PRAs are offered only to UI claimants, 
the allocation could more equitably be 
based on the state and local share of 
insured unemployment.  Changing the 
allocation rule to be based on insured 
unemployment would not penalize states 
that have higher rates.  
Summary
Economists have long touted the 
merits of incentives, pricing, and 
targeting in social programs, particularly 
reemployment programs.  These features 
have been tried in demonstration 
programs and some are now used in 
Individual Training Accounts and the 
WPRS system.  However, all three 
features previously have not been 
combined in the same program.  
Simulations suggest that successful 
implementation of such a program 
requires an understanding of the possible 
responses by participants.  Simulations 
also point to the range of behavioral 
responses necessary for PRAs to function 
well.  While findings from past studies 
indicate that measured responses to 
reemployment bonuses and expected 
wage gains from services fall short of 
what is necessary for participants to 
choose services over the bonus, final 
assessment of PRAs awaits 
implementation or demonstration of the 
program.
For links to additional information on 
PRAs, visit http://www.upjohninstitute. 
org/pra.html.
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior 
economist at the Upjohn Institute.
Randall W. Eberts is executive director of 
the Upjohn Institute.
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employment and earnings effects of 
employment services and job training 
suggest effects are more modest (Leigh 
1995).  PRA recipients might therefore 
reduce use of services in hopes of 
receiving larger reemployment bonuses. 
We also checked to see if $3,000 
would be sufficient to purchase the 
bundles of services chosen given the 
assumed prices.  If no PRA money was 
spent on bonuses and all on services, 
about one-half of 1 percent of the UI 
claimants in our Georgia sample would 
have a budget shortfall.   Among these 
claimants, the mean budget shortfall was 
$551 in the first 13 weeks and $637 
during the remainder of the UI benefit 
year.
The PRA proposal requires that the 
amount of the PRA be uniform 
throughout the state and not exceed 
$3,000.   Since the UI reemployment 
experiments set bonus offers as multiples 
of the WBA we simulated setting PRAs 
as 10 times the WBA, with a minimum of 
$1,500.  The maximum WBA in Georgia 
is $300.  This design would permit about 
15 percent more bonus offers, and it also 
may moderate the incentive for some 
claimants to accept low-paying jobs 
simply to qualify for the first bonus paid 
upon reemployment.  
The UI reemployment experiments 
paid bonuses only after at least 16 weeks 
of continuous reemployment.  In these 
experiments, the reemployment earnings 
of those offered bonuses were at least as 
high as the control groups.  The timing of 
bonus payments under the proposed 
PRAs might yield a different impact on 
wages.
The proposed formula for PRA budget 
allocations to states and local service 
To spend the entire budget 
on services, the UI beneficiary 
must expect either earnings to
 be nearly 14 percent higher 
or that employment will occur 
at least 6 weeks sooner.
